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Abstract: 
Natural resources have become a factor of interest in conflict. Unfortunately scholars and 
policymakers alike choose to focus on oil and natural gas, not freshwater, even when 
freshwater resources play a significant role in their conflict of interest. Utilizing a 
theoretical logic developed from Jane Dawson’s “resource-identity” model of conflict, 
freshwater resources are understood to be fundamental factors in the causation of 
conflicts as well as in the strategy and tactics used within the conflict. Case studies from 
Central Asia, Georgia-Abkhazia, and Russian intervention demonstrate this in the Former 
Soviet Union.    
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Introduction 
 
     The end of the Cold War shifted both the political reality of the world and the focus of 
the academic community. One academic field that has significantly grown since the 
1990s focuses on the political ramifications of the natural environment. Of particular 
interest is the idea of environmental security, or the protection of both the environment 
from human-created harm as well as the protection of humans from environment-created 
harm.
1
 Scholars and policymakers are beginning to understand how the environment 
influences conflict and societal stability. Unfortunately this research has been mostly 
limited to the study of oil and natural gas, largely ignoring other natural resources.  
     Freshwater resources, the rivers, aquifers, and all other land-based water sources, 
along with the resources directly provided by this water, such as hydropower, are one of 
the natural resources that scholars and policymakers are starting to consider as a possible 
fundamental factor in conflict around the world. This inquiry is critically needed. Having 
impacted global politics from the beginning of mankind’s history, freshwater resources 
are intricately woven into society. For example, a theory proposed by Karl Wittfogel 
finds that the need for controlled irrigation led to the first bureaucratic government 
structures.
2
 Yet freshwater resources are not only a beneficial factor in politics, 
influencing both societal growth, and conflict. World Bank officials have declared that if 
“the Wars of the twentieth century were fought over oil, the wars of [the twenty-first] 
                                                          
1
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references,” United Nations University Press, (New York, 2000), 58. 
2
 Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 2
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century will be fought over water.”3 Additionally, former United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi Annan predicts that “fierce competition for fresh water may well become a 
source of conflict and wars in the future.”4 Much of this fear over freshwater-based 
conflict stems from a serious decline of  world water quality due to pollution, and 
quantity due to drought, climate change and population growth. At least 40% of the 
global population is now threatened by water scarcity.
5
 It therefore seems natural that 
freshwater would enter into the realm of conflict. It is, after all, more essential to human 
life than oil and natural gas. Water scholar Brahma Chellaney has mapped out one 
potential conflict cycle disruption of essential freshwater resources can create: freshwater 
issues leading to high food prices, leading to social unrest, leading to extremism and 
fundamentalism, leading to overpopulation and thus increased freshwater issues.
6
 
Following similar logic, the New York Times recently reported that a long drought in 
Syria appears to be one factor fueling the current political unrest in that country.
7
 Central 
Asia is another excellent example of this, rural farmers in the region igniting conflict 
because of a lack of clean freshwater to irrigate their crops (For more on Central Asia see 
the case study below).
8
 Governments around the world have started to respond to the 
increasing influence freshwater is having on politics and global stability. In the United 
States the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Department 
                                                          
3
 Ibid, 16. 
4
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 Helen Ingram, David Feldmen, John Whiteley, “Water and Equality in a Changing Climate,” Water, Place, 
Equity, ed. John Whiteley, Helen Ingram, and Richard Perry, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008), 271.     
6
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New York, 2013), 221. 
7
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New York Times, 3 March 2015, A13. 
8
 Dominic Stucker, “Environmental Injustices, Unsustainable Livelihoods, and Conflict: Natural Capital 
Inaccessibility and Loss among Rural Households in Tajikistan,” Environmental Justice and Sustainability in 
the Former Soviet Union, ed. Julian Agyeman, Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
2009), 239. 
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of State have all started initiatives to focus on water-based national security issues. 
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even created a five-step approach for the US to 
engage freshwater issues abroad, an initiative that includes the United States’ 
maintenance of freshwater supplies in Afghanistan as a major aspect of its Counter-
Insurgency Operations (COIN).
9
 
     The United States’ use of freshwater in a counter-insurgency operation demonstrates 
that freshwater resources can be critical in all levels of conflict, from protests and 
diplomatic disputes to violent wars of both an interstate and intrastate nature. The main 
challenge levied against those who argue for a better understanding of freshwater in 
conflict is that there have been few wars between sovereign states over freshwater 
resources to date.
10
 Intrastate conflict however, separatist movements, ethnic fighting, 
and other forms of internal political instability, already witnesses significant influence 
from freshwater resources. A study conducted by Ravnborg et al. found that, while it is 
true that interstate freshwater conflict is rare, water-based conflict on the sub-state level is 
more common and growing.
11
 Brahma Chellaney further points out that freshwater’s role 
in conflict is often hidden within other, more superficial factors. He says that “conflicts, 
even when they are rooted in resource scarcity, are often camouflaged as civil wars or 
political or sectarian hostilities.”12 Put another way, “The competition for scarce 
resources likely caries greater conflict potential than the rivalries between disparate 
                                                          
9
 Committee on Foreign Relations of the U. S. Senate, “Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central 
Asia’s Growing Importance For Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” S.PRT 112-10, 22 February 2011.  
10
 Matthew Schnurr and Larry Swatuk, “Towards Critical Environmental Security,” Natural Resources and 
Social Conflict: Towards Critical Environmental Security, ed. Matthew Schnurr and Larry Swatuk, (Palgrave 
MacMillion, London, 2012), 2.  
11
 Helle Munk Ravnborg, et al., “Challenges of local water governance: the extent and intensity of local 
water-related conflict and cooperation,” Water Policy, 14(2012), 336-357.   
12
 Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 27. 
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cultural blocks. After all, underneath the cultural and religious divides are universal 
aspirations for a better life.”13 Even conflict ostensibly based on culture and religion is 
often at least partially about securing scarce natural and freshwater resources for the 
betterment of one’s group. Chellaney says that as a natural resource, freshwater is 
essential to human society, impacting human life, energy, and economics. The 
essentialness of freshwater as an increasingly scarce natural resource makes it more 
political than even oil, the natural resource traditionally studied in conflict. Researchers 
John Whiteley, Helen Ingram and Richard Perry agree. They say that “even more so than 
oil before it, water permeates the larger part of  political, economic, social, and even 
religious conflicts…water will dominate world resource politics by the end of the twenty-
first century much as oil dominated the late twentieth century.”14   
     It is therefore necessary for policymakers to understand the implications of freshwater 
resources within conflict. Freshwater is often a fundamental factor, both as a causation of 
the conflict and as a factor affecting the consequences and outcome of the conflict. 
Infrastructure related to freshwater resources is often targeted during conflict, water 
treatment plants and hydropower plants the subject of many attacks.
15
 Chellaney refers to 
this as a “water weapon,” targeting freshwater resources for political gain.16 As a target, 
freshwater resources become political in nature, entering into the power dynamics of the 
conflict. Chellaney addresses power in freshwater conflicts, finding that if an upstream 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
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 John Whitely, Helen Ingram and Richard Perry, “The Importance of Equity and the Limits of Efficiency in 
Water Resources,” Water, Place, & Equity, ed. John Whitely, Helen Ingram, Richard Perry, (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2008), 1. 
15
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group risks “affecting the quality or quantity of transboundary flows, the response of the 
downriver party- or lack of it- will likely be shaped by prevailing power factors.”17  
     The idea of power and its distribution in conflict must be understood when 
considering the role of freshwater resources. As a critical resource, control of freshwater 
can lead to changes in the power dynamic with serious consequences within conflict. 
Control, in this sense, refers to the potential ability to use a resource, in this case 
freshwater resources, for direct, political or military use. An entity with complete control 
can use the resources as it pleases while an entity with no control is unable to use the 
resource, often having limited access to the resource. To understand control of freshwater 
it might be helpful to explore some examples from North American politics. Canada 
currently bemoans the difference between its ability to manage fish populations in the 
Fraser River, which it has complete control over, and the Columbia River which it shares 
with the United States. Joint control, created by the Columbia River flowing through both 
countries, allows the United States to have leverage over Canadian policy, preventing 
Canada from accomplishing the same fishery protection it has in the Fraser River.
18
 
However context is important and every freshwater power relationship is unique. For 
example compare Canada’s superior “bargaining position” over freshwater resources to 
Mexico’s inferior position. Canada has greater control over freshwater it shares with the 
United States because it is the upstream state, and has more freshwater in total than 
Mexico to use against a thirsty United States. It is also wealthier than Mexico, making it 
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 Ibid, 180. 
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more the United States’ equal, and therefore granting it a stronger bargaining position.19 
Canada has thus historically had greater success in diplomatic freshwater disputes with 
the United States than Mexico which must live with the limited and mostly unusable 
freshwater it currently receives from the United States.
20
 Control of freshwater resources 
therefore involves many different, interrelated factors, some natural, some political, 
making each situation of freshwater conflict unique.  
     This thesis argues freshwater resources are a fundamental factor in conflict. It 
emphasizes that this is often true even in conflict where freshwater has not traditionally 
been considered significant. For instance, while oil and natural gas are often discussed in 
relation to conflict in the Former Soviet Union, there are many examples of freshwater 
also being fundamental in these conflicts. In order to truly understand conflict in the 
Former Soviet Union and find solutions for lasting peace in the region therefore requires 
a better understanding of freshwater’s role in conflict. This thesis will focus on conflicts 
in Central Asia, Georgia, and on Russian intervention to demonstrate that freshwater 
resources are a fundamental factor in conflict of all types, and need to be considered even 
in regions whose conflict is not commonly associated with natural resources beyond oil, 
such as in the Former Soviet Union.   
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 Paul Hirt, “Developing a Plentiful Resource: Transboundary Rivers in the Pacific Northwest,” Water, 
Place, & Equity, ed. John Whitely, Helen Ingram, Richard Perry, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008), 148-149.  
20
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Philosophical/Theoretical Foundation 
 
     Several scholars are advancing the field of natural resources in conflict with ideas that 
are potentially beneficial to this thesis. Nina Casperson reports that a separatist group 
must believe in its ability to have a stable, “viable” state if it is going to start and 
maintain conflict.
21
 Control of natural resources is consequently a fundamental factor 
because it reassures the group of its ability to thrive once political goals are met. In order 
to consider separating a group must have the needed resources to not just survive, but to 
grow and prosper. This can include freshwater for direct human consumption as well as 
for industry, agriculture and hydroelectricity. The work of Philippe Le Billon on the 
effects of government control of natural resources is also intriguing. He says that “not 
only does resource dependence create a political and economic context that increases the 
risk of armed conflict, but whether or not a resource is more accessible to the government 
or to a rebel group may shape the likelihood and course of civil war.”22 He defines 
control through two sets of factors. The first is point vs diffuse; point resources being 
confined to a limited area or limited number of actors while diffuse resources are 
scattered or widespread throughout a territory. The second is proximate vs distant; 
proximate meaning the government has easy control of the resource which is not in 
territory controlled by rebels while distant means it is hard for the government to control 
                                                          
21
 Nina Casperson, “The South Caucasus after Kosovo: Renewed Independence Hopes?,” Europe-Asia 
Studies, 65:5, (2013), 932. 
22
 Philippe Le Billon, Fueling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, (Routledge, New York, 2013), 
29. 
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the resources as they are located in remote or rebel controlled territory.
23
 Le Billon 
believes that through these factors the following outcomes are realized: 
Point/Proximate: Coup d’e’tat 
Point/Distant: Secession 
Diffuse/Proximate: Mass Rebellion 
Diffuse/Distant- Warlordism 
24
 
He further says that “a government’s greater access to resources can motivate rebel 
groups to defect to the government, provide an incentive to enter peace negotiations, or 
lure rebel leaders to the capital to join a government of national reconciliation.”25 
    These scholars have however failed to advance the field adequately for a complete 
understanding of natural resources, including freshwater, in conflict. Nina Casperson’s 
focus is too narrow. She addresses reasons why freshwater resources could help lead a 
group to start a conflict, but not how they may be used during the conflict. Le Billon’s 
theory correctly predicts the type of conflict present in many cases. For instance his 
theory correctly suggests that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, discussed in the case 
studies below, would be a secessionist movement because of its point and distant 
freshwater resources.
26
 However his theory has limited reach beyond often accurate 
predictions of the form a conflict will take. Le Billon focuses mainly on the ability of 
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24
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 Ibid, 46. 
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 Ibid, 36.  
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natural resources to provide monetary support to sustain separatist movements.
27
 Such 
narrow focuses are a common limitation in the field. This thesis instead takes a more 
holistic approach, exploring how power distributions and identity can cause natural 
resources, specifically freshwater resources, to take on a larger role in the causation, 
strategy and cessation of conflict. To get past these limitations requires a philosophical 
focus beyond economic profits, with both the decision to create conflict and how the 
conflict is carried out accounted for.
28
  
     Instead of being held back by the limitations that characterize many of this field’s 
scholars, a more appropriate understanding of freshwater resources in conflict can be 
acquired through an application of the theoretical framework utilized by Jane Dawson, a 
notable scholar in the field of the environment and politics. Dawson’s work focuses on 
how the anti-nuclear movement in the Former Soviet Union was used by nationalist 
groups to help their cause, eventually leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This 
connection between ethnicity, national identity, and the environment is what Dawson has 
termed “eco-nationalism.”29 Dawson’s case studies demonstrate how nationalist groups 
used the anti-nuclear movement to rally support against the Soviet government as a 
foreign, Russian, unsympathetic organization willing to see locals suffer for its own gain. 
Even when nationalist movements were not strong enough to rally around nationalist 
ideals outright, anti-nuclear sentiment was able to act as a “surrogate issue” becoming the 
                                                          
27
 Ibid, 44. 
28
 Essentially these scholars fail to develop an all-encompassing understanding of freshwater resources in 
conflict because their theories are largely based on an economic or market paradigm of thinking that is 
unable to accurately account for environmental factors in politics. A more complete understanding 
requires thinking beyond the simple economics of the matter (Gillroy, 3-37). 
29
 Jane Dawson, Eco-Nationalism: Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and 
Ukraine, (Duke University Press, Durham, 1996), 5.  
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movement through which peoples confronted the Soviet government.
30
 The idea of eco-
nationalism therefore demonstrates the ability for environmental issues to transcend 
monetary benefit to conflicting parties, additionally factoring into the causation and 
tactics utilized by these groups. The premier argument against freshwater resources as a 
factor in conflict is that there have been limited outright water wars. Often the 
counterargument provided is that freshwater resources factor into the causation of 
conflict, such as scarce freshwater resources leading to crop failure and then social 
unrest. However, Dawson’s case studies demonstrate that this need not be the only 
connection between freshwater resources and conflict. Even more intimate, fundamental 
connections are possible. Environmental factors can be one and the same with other 
movements, an integral part of the marginalization of a group and in turn part of the 
strategy to reverse that marginalization.  
     Dawson’s work is based on a “resource-identity hybrid” model of conflict.31 This two 
tier model suggests that to understand any conflict requires the study of both factors. 
Exploration of only half of the model would be an incomplete analysis. Within her 
discussion of the model, Dawson brings up Mancur Olsen’s theory that it is in an 
individual’s best interest to free-ride off of the efforts of others instead of personally 
entering into a conflict, gaining the benefits without the risks.
32
 Dawson accounts for this, 
finding that conflict is only rife if there is a group that can mobilize itself as a victim that 
needs change. She says that those in conflict are:  
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 Ibid, 163.  
31
 Ibid, 12.  
32
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seeking a forum through which to express their feelings and to strengthen 
self-identity. In charting the development of a movement, it is therefore 
necessary to look beyond strategic calculations and to also consider the 
movement’s function in affirming and developing group identity.33 
For this reason part of Dawson’s model is identity. The anti-nuclear movements in the 
Former Soviet Union demonstrate that an environmental factor can help fuel a group’s 
cohesion against a perceived negative foreign influence. In areas where there was a 
strong sense of nationalism environmental factors increased this feeling and were used by 
nationalist movements, while in areas with a low sense of nationalism the environment 
was of little concern. For instance, the anti-nuclear movement was stronger in Lithuania 
where it helped fuel a strong sense of Lithuanian identity versus the outside world, while 
in Crimea, with a large Russian ethnic population, the anti-nuclear movement sputtered 
with no nationalist tension or victimized group’s identity to associate with.34 The 
environment, its health and group control over it, was therefore an essential aspect of the 
group identities of nationalists seeking to gain independence from the Soviet Union. The 
connection between environmental factors and the identity that sparks conflict should 
therefore not be underplayed. Dawson says that “in numerous inter-state environmental 
battles as well as domestic struggles between regions or ethnically defined territories, the 
potential certainly exists for environmental struggles to take on nationalist overtones.”35 
However the reverse is also true, nationalist struggles could easily take on environmental 
overtones as they work to enhance group identity through conflict. Environmental factors 
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enhance group identity while group identity enhances the importance of environmental 
factors. Dawson’s model thus suggests that environmental resources, such as freshwater, 
can be significant to the cause of conflict, fueling the group identity that makes people 
demand, and more successfully attain, change.    
     For the purposes of exploring freshwater resources’ role in conflict, Dawson’s idea of 
identity will be expanded upon; group identity’s connection to freshwater resources being 
a characteristic that factors into the causation of conflict. Dawson’s logic of identity is 
introduced to understand why people create conflict. Essentially people need to have their 
sense of self, their identity, threatened if they are to start conflict. When freshwater 
resources in some way either threaten, or bolster a group or individual identity they act as 
a causation of conflict. Freshwater resources, with their strong influence on all parts of 
human life and society will certainly have a comparably deep connection to group 
identity and survival, intimately connecting freshwater to conflict. While freshwater 
resources can create conflict through the money, electricity, and other goods they 
provide, economic consideration alone does not actually describe why the conflict was 
started.  A group’s identity may be threatened or bolstered by how much control it has 
over necessary resources. A group may start a conflict if they feel their group is 
discriminated against, not receiving its fair share of freshwater resources. Likewise, 
should the group not have enough freshwater resources for basic survival the very 
existence of the group depends on conflict. Freshwater can cause conflict through a 
famine that unites farmers for better irrigation, or by raising food prices and therefore 
causing regional social unrest, groups clinging to their homes, land and way of life, all 
that identifies them to a certain group. A group may additionally be given the confidence 
14 
 
it needs to revolt should they control enough freshwater resources to guarantee they could 
survive as a viable independent entity. Freshwater resources may be a tool used to 
enhance ones identity, serving as a border between opposing group territories, unifying a 
group, being of cultural significance to the group, or be used as a powerful tool with 
which to gain independence or concessions. Freshwater resources can therefore have 
numerous connections to the threatened group identities that lead people to seek solutions 
through conflict. The context of a specific situation determines the degree to which a 
group’s identity is either threatened of bolstered by freshwater resources, suggesting that 
care be taken in understanding freshwater’s role. Ethnic violence, or a land grab could, 
after all, be caused by freshwater resources creating ethnic tension or providing impetus 
for snatching more land. One critical way to understand freshwater resources as a 
fundamental factor in conflict is therefore to explore when and how freshwater resources 
are a factor in the causation of conflict because of their impact on identity.     
     In the introduction of this thesis a common understanding of control of natural 
resources was explained. Dawson’s resource-identity model not only accounts for 
control, but expands upon it through the idea of resource mobilization, the second tier of 
her model. Control, after all, is important in that it creates the ability to mobilize 
resources. Mobilization is the actual utilization of resources for a group’s, political, 
military, or other gain. Dawson characterizes resources that may be mobilized for a cause 
as both tangible resources, like natural resources and food, as well as intangible resources 
like the ability to associate with alternative political movements during Perestroika. 
Understanding what resources a movement controls and how, in context, these resources 
15 
 
are mobilized allows for a better understand of the movement and enhances the ability to 
predict the movement’s actions, Dawson saying that: 
Collective actors are assumed to utilize strategic instrumental rationality to 
determine how best to pursue movement goals within a given context. 
Given specific resource availability, preexisting organizational form, and 
opportunities, the collectivity will rationally select its tactics and strategy 
to maximize its potential for success. Thus, according to this school of 
thought, knowledge of resource availability, of organization, and of 
opportunity structures should yield a greater understanding of mobilization 
patterns utilized by a particular social movement. Movement tactics, 
development, and level of success are expected to depend on these 
structural factors.
36
  
This moves beyond the typical idea of monetary gain from natural resources by 
suggesting that quantity, access, and control of resources all factor in to a conflict. 
Resource poor groups must take up defensive strategies while rich and powerful groups 
are insulated from threat.
37
 While freshwater resources are not prevalent in Dawson’s 
case studies, it is a logical extension of her argument to see how this thinking can apply. 
Dawson does point out that the Soviet system, characterized by a lack of individual 
control over material and natural resources through deferment to the state, made it harder 
for people to organize the other, more intangible resources needed to sustain a growing 
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social movement.
38
 For instance people cannot worry about finding a place to meet to 
discuss grievances if it is a struggle to simply ensure that irrigation is provided for their 
fields. Dawson points out that one must consider the consequences of joining a political 
movement.
39
 If a group does not control their own resources the consequences of conflict 
may simply be too high. Maintaining “stable participation” in a movement requires a lack 
of scarcity when it comes to key resources in the conflict.
40
 If one controls key resources, 
often including freshwater, then one can mobilize these resources as a tool to sustain the 
conflict and reach political goals.  
     Dawson’s logic of resource mobilization forms the foundation of freshwater resources 
affecting the strategy and tactics of conflict. The resources a group does and does not 
have the ability to mobilize factors greatly into how they carry-out conflict and their 
abilities vis-á-vie their opponent. In this way mobilization of freshwater resources can be 
understood as a power dialectic between the groups in conflict. When, in context, a 
freshwater resource has the potential to be used politically, the groups involved will 
jockey to gain greater control over the freshwater resource so that they may mobilize the 
resource for the greatest political, military, or social gain. The more a state or dominant 
group is able to mobilize freshwater resources, the less such resources may be mobilized 
by another group to weaken the majority or even break away. This allows the dominate 
group to use freshwater resources to stifle rebellion. The marginalized group in the 
conflict will attempt to gain control of key freshwater resources because mobilization of 
such resources can shift power to their side, preventing harm to itself and ensuring the 
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group’s identity, or sovereignty. The more that this group gains control of the resources 
the more it can mobilize freshwater as a political tool to extract concessions from others. 
The first seeks to mobilize freshwater resources to ensure the status quo while the second 
seeks to mobilize freshwater resources to challenge the status quo. Through this dialectic 
freshwater resources can be viewed within the lens of realpolitik as another, more 
fundamental factor leading to fluctuating power between two groups in conflict, with the 
potential to seriously alter the outcomes of said conflict. Another way that this thesis will 
demonstrate that freshwater resources are a fundamental factor in conflict is therefore by 
providing examples of when freshwater resources are mobilized as part of the strategy 
and tactics utilized in conflict to obtain political and military goals.  
     Dawson’s theory thus demonstrates how freshwater resources can have a stronger and 
more fundamental connection to the causation of conflict than previously considered, 
while contextually also altering the strategy and tactics utilized in the conflict based on 
freshwater’s essential contribution to changing power dynamics. Through an expansion 
on Dawson’s “resource-identity hybrid” model this thesis finds a philosophical logic that 
has the holistic theoretical structure necessary to understand how freshwater resources 
fundamentally impact empirical conflict. To argue that freshwater resources are a 
fundamental factor in the Former Soviet Union, however, requires that case studies from 
the area in question now be explored, detailing how freshwater resources played a 
significant role in them. To accomplish this the following case studies have been 
arranged in accordance to the framework developed above. First freshwater resources as 
a causation of conflict through identity will be demonstrated using a case study on the 
Central Asian region of the Former Soviet Union. Following this, freshwater resources as 
18 
 
a factor in conflict strategy and tactics through resource mobilization will be 
demonstrated through case studies on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as well as Russian 
intervention.    
  
19 
 
Identity and Causation of Conflict: Central Asian Case Study 
 
     Utilizing Dawson’s logic of identity, examples of when freshwater resources are a 
causation of conflict should be explored. If freshwater resources are fundamental they 
should threaten group identity, creating the conditions which push people to seek political 
redress and conflict. An excellent example of freshwater resources being the causation of 
conflict through group identity in the Former Soviet Union is in the Central Asian region. 
      The Central Asian region of the Former Soviet Union has experienced both interstate 
and intrastate violence and conflict. This violence is usually small in scale, but its 
presence and frequency demands that such conflict not be ignored. While it is popular to 
discuss religious fundamentalism, and oil and natural gas as major factors in this conflict, 
freshwater resources are also an important factor; perhaps even the most important factor. 
Interstate conflict in the region has included Kyrgyzstan stopping freshwater flows to 
Kazakhstan for ten days in 1998, and Tajikistan threatening to use the Syr Darya River as 
an “offense weapon” against Uzbekistan in a territory dispute.41 Additionally Uzbek 
soldiers attacked a Turkmen water installation in 2001 (the Kara-Kum Complex).
42
 
Several times violence and military operations have been used by the Central Asian states 
to claim control of land that contains large amounts of freshwater among other natural 
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42
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resources.
43
 Beyond violent conflict, many of the diplomatic disputes between 
neighboring states in the region are over control of regional freshwater resources. 
Intrastate conflict in Central Asia includes the Tajik civil war, and violence that has 
flared in the regions of Batken-Isfara, Zeravshan and the Ferghana Valley.
44
Furthermore, 
a dispute over the Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River, part of the Amu Darya Watershed, 
led to turmoil between Tajikistan and its downstream neighbors, including ethnic 
violence that was not sanctioned by the relevant state governments.
45
 
      The above are only a few examples out of many conflicts in Central Asia that, 
underneath the superficial power confrontations have freshwater resources as a 
fundamental factor in their causation. This begs the question of why freshwater resources 
create so much conflict in the region. The short answer is that the freshwater resources 
needed to maintain Central Asian societies are mismanaged and increasingly scarce. The 
heart and soul of the Central Asian region are the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers 
which make up the Aral Sea Basin. All of the local countries are dependent on these two 
rivers and their tributaries, ranging from Tajikistan which is completely enclosed in the 
Aral Sea Basin, to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan each 70-99 percent in the 
basin and Kazakhstan which is 13 percent in this disputed basin.
46
 Agriculture that is 
dependent on the Aral Sea Basin’s freshwater employs 40% of a growing population in 
the region while supplying greater than 50% of regional GDP. The regional economy and 
the survival of many locals are reliant upon freshwater dependent cash-crop agriculture, 
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especially cotton. The basin is politically arranged so that upstream states like Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan have 90% of the hydropower potential of the region, and control over 
65% of the freshwater itself while the downstream states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan consume 85% of the freshwater resources.
47
 These two rivers can 
consequently be regarded “as a cultural, economic, geographical and political core for 
Central Asia.”48 Freshwater is therefore a fundamental component of the region’s 
identities, and a spark for conflict. This is especially true because the state borders of the 
post-Soviet reality mix ethnic groups and freshwater resources between multiple states 
and regions. As people try to control the water they need to survive, ethnic and cultural 
problems arise.
49
 It has been found that as many as two-thirds of provinces within Central 
Asian gain at least 50% of their freshwater from sources that have in some way been 
under another province’s, or state’s control.50 Add ethnic group identity to this mix and 
conflicts between opposing groups attempting to control the same scarce resources 
materialize. For people, their community, their ethnic group, and their state to survive 
and prosper, control of adequate amounts of the freshwater resources now dispersed 
haphazardly between groups, is needed.  
     Within the Soviet Union freshwater disputes were internal issues solved by the state. 
Now freshwater is seen to have a “fugitive nature” with states attempting to appease their 
local populations through attempts to control as much of the local freshwater resources as 
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possible.
51
 However no state is in a position to completely control the Aral Sea Basin, 
leaving the possibility for conflict open, and creating a real threat to the people who are 
dependent on the region’s freshwater.52 There are some legal frameworks controlling 
regional freshwater relations, such as the Central Asian Water Sector Coordination 
Initiative, and the Aral Sea Basin Program, but none of these have accomplished much in 
their attempts to alleviate the potential for freshwater conflict. The identities connected to 
regional freshwater resources are too strong to allow normal diplomacy and 
cooperation.
53
 While the people of the area are used to the free freshwater of the Soviet 
Era, they now face declining government budgets which limit the allocation of water and 
the maintenance of irrigation lines and water pumps that are critical for continuation of 
the local way of life. The regimes governing the Central Asian states will never be stable 
until they provide the means for their people to maintain their identity through the ability 
to prosper, clean water a leading factor of progress in the region. Instability will grow if 
increased scarcity of freshwater is allowed to continue. Central Asian scholar Eric 
Sievers finds that though governments use propaganda and rhetoric about the importance 
and historical value of freshwater in the region, they fail to create adequate safeguards for 
freshwater resources.
54
 In international relations, however, these governments are 
nationalist and zero-sum over freshwater issues, refusing to surrender freshwater to other 
groups, creating conflict to enhance their individual freshwater distribution. Interstate 
conflict is therefore created by states to prevent intrastate conflict. Local governments are 
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right to worry about freshwater-created internal violence. Christopher Bosch of the World 
Bank says that “efficient water management requires advanced engineering, expertise in 
water saving and resource planning in a region where most water simply vanishes” and 
money is scarce.
55
 People need quantities of water that in the current political, social and 
physical landscape of the region cannot possibly be provided. This is especially true for 
farmers who need irrigation for cash crops like cotton. One wife of a Tajik farmer 
characterized her family’s dependence on freshwater by lamenting that “water is all we 
have.”56 It is this desperate need for freshwater resources that often moves people to 
violence in the region. When a people are threatened by the loss of this critical resource 
they turn to their state, their ethnic group, or any other group they closely identify with as 
a means for collective survival through increased acquisition of the resource. 
Unfortunately since freshwater is scarce this often comes at the expense of another group, 
sparking ethnic or other forms of identity violence.   
     There are many factors that lead freshwater resources to threaten identities, causing 
unrest and conflict in Central Asia. Scarcity of freshwater is a major issue, and only 
growing because of skyrocketing demand. From 1911-1960 about 56 km cubed per year 
flowed into the Aral Sea, but growing demand for freshwater caused only around 6 km 
cubed of freshwater to enter the Aral Sea per year in the 1980’s.57 This increase in 
freshwater withdrawal has only gotten worse, leading to the disappearance of almost all 
of the Aral Sea. The countries’ annual withdrawal from the Aral Sea Basin is as follows: 
Uzbekistan 58 km cubed (52% withdrawal), Turkmenistan 23 km cubed (21%), 
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Tajikistan 12 km cubed (11%), Kazakhstan 11 km cubed (10%), and Kyrgyzstan 5 km 
cubed (4%).
58
 These large withdrawals create freshwater scarcity and demonstrate the 
incredible demand for freshwater resources in the area. This demand forces groups into 
conflict to obtain the necessary freshwater for their livelihood and survival. Just as anti-
nuclear campaigns bolstered anti-Soviet sentiment, as shown in Dawson’s work, 
increased demand and, as a result, increased scarcity of freshwater in Central Asia has 
bolstered ethnic, religious and other group identities in the region as locals struggle to 
obtain the resources required to prosper, blaming “outsiders” and foreigners for their 
freshwater woes. States therefore have conflicts with other states over freshwater to 
appease their citizens while internally ethnic groups have disputes over what little 
freshwater the state is able to provide.  
     The problem is, however, more complex than increasing demand for freshwater 
withdrawals alone. Control of the actual flow of freshwater resources also creates 
conflict. The region’s rivers flow from low use states like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
who control much of the freshwater resources despite their low use, to heavy users like 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This puts stress on interstate relations because those with 
control of the headwaters have the least need for the freshwater itself.
59
 Inter-seasonal 
variability to the flow of the rivers, made worse by the dams controlled by upstream 
countries which release freshwater when they need more electricity (winter) not when 
those downstream need freshwater for irrigation (summer) has also sparked diplomatic 
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conflict.
60
 Instead of cooperating, groups attempt to gain the most from the resources they 
control to the detriment of others. Kyrgyzstan once caused uproar when it declared 
through the 2001 Law on International Use of Water Objects, Water Resources and 
Water Management Facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic, that freshwater is an economic 
entity, and that any freshwater that originates in Kyrgyzstan is property of the state and 
therefore ought to be purchased from the Kyrgyz.
61
 Here again freshwater resources are 
connected to nationalist gain as Dawson’s logic predicts. One group, the Kyrgyz, feel 
they may use the freshwater resources in their territory without thought of others’ 
interests, leading to greater scarcity of resources available to the latter groups and 
increased identity-based conflict and tensions between the Central Asian states, as well as 
worsening intrastate relations between local Kyrgyz and other ethnicities.   
     Beyond this upstream versus downstream power dynamic, regional irrigation 
networks are currently in desperate need of repair, failing to deliver adequate resources to 
those who need them. It is estimated that necessary repairs throughout the region would 
cost over $16 billion which neither locals nor state governments in the region are able to 
provide.
62
 The region’s states have acknowledged that the disrepair of irrigation networks 
has led to social unrest; Uzbekistan’s leadership even suggesting that privatization of 
irrigation is wrong, control of freshwater resources needing to remain under government 
control so that corruption can be prevented and ethnic conflict avoided.
63
 Uzbekistan 
therefore maintains stability through government maintenance of control over freshwater 
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resources. The majority of conflicts over violations of freshwater quota agreements 
happen intrastate not interstate, suggesting that more identity violence between ethnic 
groups would erupt if governments did not have some control over freshwater 
resources.
64
 Unrest is fueled by the loss of livelihoods and rural identity, as well as 
economic hardships from growing food prices in cities, created by crumbling 
infrastructure unable to provide farmers in the region with necessary freshwater 
resources. To obtain freshwater resources, people are apt to attack whoever is perceived 
as preventing their group from obtaining its desired freshwater, whether it be the state or 
the easier target of another ethnic group.   
     The period directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union additionally witnessed 
abnormally high freshwater flows in Central Asia. For this reason the people of the 
region laid claim to more freshwater than the Aral Sea Basin is normally able to 
provide.
65
 Conflict arises now that people are not being supplied with what they feel they 
are entitled to, based on their ethnic or other identified group’s previous claim. Historical 
control of freshwater resources by certain groups also plays a role. For instance the Tajiks 
historically controlled the Isfara River, which is now under the control of the Kyrgyz, 
leading to disputes between the two.
66
 We therefore see that freshwater resources’ 
connection to conflict in the region is more fundamentally a question of identity and 
entitlement than economic deprivation. These freshwater resources have cultural 
significance to ethnic groups and communities in the region, who feel entitled to 
freshwater and believe in their own historical connections to it. Now that these 
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connections between man and resource have been broken, groups are trying to win back 
what they feel is theirs, a part of who they are, violently if need be.  
     It is not just quantity that is important however. The quality of freshwater supplied 
also plays a role in the politics of the area. Increases in the salinity of water, and the 
presence of pesticides and fertilizers in freshwater resources means that those 
downstream are being slowly poisoned by the freshwater controlled and first used by 
those upstream. For instance protests have occurred in Uzbekistan over an aluminum 
plant in Tajikistan that pollutes a shared river.
67
 Additionally the Kara-Kalpak minority in 
Uzbekistan finds that 70% of adults and 60% of children are unwell because of exposure 
to upstream pollution. Such high percentages of sickness have caused political angst in 
the regions of Uzbekistan where the Kara-Kalpaks live.
68
 Uzbekistan has also found that 
3 million acres of its farmland is now too salty to be farmed, putting the whole state’s 
economy at risk.
69
 Downstream groups consequently feel like the victims of upstream 
groups, sparking acts of retribution, both through state action and through smaller-scale 
ethnic violence and protest. It is therefore more correct to say that lack of clean 
freshwater resources is what threatens local identities, creating conflict in the region.  
     A focus on some of the Central Asian states and regions may be helpful in 
understanding how freshwater resources create identity conflict in Central Asia. First 
there is Uzbekistan and its large cotton-farming economy. In a survey 90% of 
Uzbekistan’s population answered in the affirmative that social order and discipline need 
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to be strengthened in their country, suggesting Uzbekistan is unlikely to see much 
internal unrest.
70
 One reason people are settling for active government control of their 
lives is because of their dependence on freshwater for cotton growing which makes them 
in turn dependent on government maintained irrigation. This does not mean that there is 
no unrest. Many Uzbeks believe in an “Uzbeks first” distribution of resources which 
strains interethnic relations, demonstrating once again the link environmental resources 
can have to nationalism.
71
 There have been clashes over ethnicity and freshwater 
especially in the regions of Uzbekistan within the Ferghana Valley such as Andijan in 
May and Osh in June of 1990.
72
 Additionally internal conflicts have included a spat in 
which the Suirkhandarya and Bukhara minorities were blamed for water shortages in the 
Khorezm Province.
73
  
     In the realm of interstate politics, while Uzbekistan is a downstream state, it also has 
the military and political power to make it a potential leader in Central Asian politics.
74
 
Uzbekistan has used military incursions and boundary claims in attempts to widen its 
control of regional land and freshwater resources including in the Osh region of 
Kyrgyzstan and the Khujand region of Tajikistan (both in the Ferghana Valley).
75
 
Additionally Uzbekistan is quick to defend its freshwater from upstream threats, Brahma 
Chellaney saying that “In the Amu Darya Basin, an activity that was viewed positively in 
the soviet times- to increase upstream water-storage capacity for the benefit of the 
regional economy- is in the post-independence era of sharpening intercountry and cross-
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identity rivalry considered a threat to the interests of the dominant user of water, the 
downriver power, Uzbekistan.”76 Uzbekistan has used threats of military action to stop 
dam projects by both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on the Vakhsh River. Uzbekistan is a 
state with strong dependence on freshwater resources originating in upstream states. The 
government takes a very active role in securing freshwater for its citizens and attempts to 
control as much of the regional freshwater resources as possible, ensuring its economy, 
well-being and therefore identity of its citizens through conflict and the bullying of other 
states. Should Uzbekistan have all the freshwater resources it needs to maintain its 
identity as a state,  it would have little reason to constantly be a thorn in the side of the 
other Central Asian countries. 
     Tajikistan is another good example because it shows the complex web of “debts and 
obligations” that cotton farmers in the area are saddled with.  Many farmers in Tajikistan 
are contractually obligated to have a crop that is 80% cotton and stack up endless debts, 
mostly with the government which exploits the debt in its quest to maintain control.
77
 The 
government retains control of the majority of internal irrigation systems, which only 
provide 36% of Tajikistan’s citizens with the necessary 20-50 L of freshwater per day 
thought suitable for survival, let alone fruitful farming.
78
 This is particularly problematic 
considering Tajikistan is an upstream state with control over significant amounts of 
regional freshwater resources. Because non-irrigated farms produce at best a third of 
what an irrigated farm does in Central Asia, such policies have made the people of 
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Tajikistan increasingly dependent on family, ethnic and regional group support.
79
 When 
loss of freshwater threatens the individual they turn to these groups for help, increasing 
their identification with the group and their distrust of others. Freshwater scarcity 
additionally produces unemployment in the young which is believed to have led to an 
increase in religious fundamentalism.
80
 One explanation for the Tajik civil war is that this 
religious fundamentalism and increase in regional identity mobilized the population.
81
 
Since lack of freshwater resources helped create the regional identities as well as the 
religious fundamentalism, it was alienation from local freshwater resources that created a 
crisis of identity which led to the civil war. During the civil war some of the heaviest 
fighting witnessed was in Qurghonteppa Province which has access to large amounts of 
irrigation resources, suggesting that freshwater was a major prize to be won in the 
conflict.
82
 However the civil war has not been the only conflict weathered by Tajikistan. 
For example in 2008 Tajik villagers stopped the construction of a dam on a river that 
feeds both Tajiks in Khoja-i alo, and Kyrgyz in Yakkaterak and Samarkandek. One of the 
Tajik activists claimed this was done because they felt the Kyrgyz were trying to make 
claims to a disputed border. He claimed that should the Kyrgyz win this dispute the local 
Tajiks would lose access to much of their freshwater and therefore their livelihoods and 
rural identities.
83
  
     Finally, no discussion of freshwater conflict in Central Asia is complete without an 
examination of the Ferghana Valley, part of the Syr Darya Watershed. While “in terms of 
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geography, economics, and culture, the Ferghana Valley is a single country,” it is now 
split by the state borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
84
 The Ferghana 
Valley is a major cotton growing region and features a large network of irrigation pipes 
that are now also split and divided by state borders, just like the region’s ethnic groups.85 
It is because of this that the Ferghana Valley is now known to be a hot spot for conflict 
and violence over freshwater rights, resulting in hundreds of deaths in recent history.
86
 
Some of the ethnic violence includes Turks attacking Uzbeks and Tajiks in 1989 and 
Uzbeks fighting Kyrgyz in 1990.
87
 Additionally smaller minority ethnic groups have 
sparked violence in the valley, including a community of Meskhetians living in the 
Uzbek part of the valley.
88
 States have additionally used freshwater as a coercive measure 
for national interests leading to identity violence in the valley.
89
 For instance 
Uzbekistan’s threat to send troops into Kyrgyzstan’s area of the Ferghana Valley led to 
Kyrgyzstan’s counter threat to blow up a dam that would have killed thousands 
throughout the valley.
90
  
     Before being split into different states, the Ferghana Valley was peaceful with most 
people “unaware” of ethnicity, not associating as strongly with various divisive identities 
as they do today. Local people have now been forced into the middle of ethnic conflicts 
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over resources.
91
 It is important to point out that states have been unsuccessful in creating 
national identities in the region, but that ethnicities have formed the focus of people’s 
attempts to allocate and control freshwater resources.
92
 The Ferghana Valley, rife with 
several dispersed groups all of which need access to shrinking freshwater resources, is 
consequently the center of violent freshwater conflict in Central Asia. Now that people 
are faced with new political borders and senses of community, and therefore new 
freshwater rights, local identities have become critical and something worth killing for in 
the Ferghana Valley.  
     Central Asia is therefore unstable, state, ethnic, and community identities fueled by 
problems with the freshwater resources that have become the very core of life in the 
region. Conflict arises as these groups attempt to gain greater control of freshwater 
resources for their own group’s security and well-being. This makes Central Asia an 
excellent example of how freshwater resources can be the causation of conflict. 
Causation of conflict is, however only part of why freshwater resources are a 
fundamental factor in conflict. In the following sections additional case studies will 
demonstrate mobilization of freshwater resources impacting the strategy and tactics of 
conflict in the Former Soviet Union. 
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Resource Mobilization as Strategy and Tactics: Georgia-Abkhazia Case Study 
 
     Based on Dawson’s idea of resource mobilization, freshwater resources can 
additionally be understood as a fundamental factor in conflict through their influence on 
power equations within conflict, dictating strategies and tactics that various entities may 
have at their disposal. In this way freshwater resources act as political tools leading a 
conflict either closer to peace or deeper into instability. Though focused on causation, the 
Central Asian case study above demonstrates many examples of freshwater resources 
additionally being mobilized as a weapon in the conflicts they created. In the following 
argument this characteristic of freshwater resources in the strategy and tactics of conflict 
will be examined in greater detail. First the ability to harness freshwater resource 
mobilization to create peace or stability will be shown through a case study on the 
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and then freshwater resource mobilization as intervention 
will be shown through a case study on Russian intervention.  
     In many contexts freshwater resources may be mobilized in ways that stabilize a 
conflict and bring about peace. Like in any peace there are certainly winners and losers, 
or groups that are happy with the results as well as some who are not. The critical 
element is that freshwater resources were mobilized to create this political reality. Within 
the Former Soviet Union an excellent example of this is the conflict between the 
sovereign state of Georgia and the separatist region of Abkhazia.  
     Since before it became an independent state, several ethnic groups within Georgia 
have attempted to separate from the whole; seeking either independence or recognition 
34 
 
under a different political entity. While South Ossetia and its struggle are better known in 
the West because of the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia, Abkhazian 
separatism has been just as deadly and consuming for the Georgians. Abkhazia initially 
fought to be an independent soviet republic, however when the Soviet Union collapsed it 
suddenly found itself under the sovereign control of Georgia.
93
 There has been off-and-on 
violence between the two, a bloody but short civil war in 1992, and again some fighting 
during the 2008 conflict, leaving both sides bloodied and bitter. Abkhazia not only faces 
many casualties, but also the costs of rebuilding after these conflicts and living with the 
lingering consequences of seeking independence. The destruction even includes the 
Abkhazian capitol, Sukhumi, which fell during the civil war. During this conflict 
Georgian military forces proved superior, only being pushed out of Abkhazian territory 
when the Russian Army and Chechen guerillas entered the fray.
94
 Over all estimates 
conclude that 10,000-15,000 people were killed in this conflict alone.
95
 Beyond the direct 
violence, Georgia has blockaded Abkhazia for years, forcing Abkhazia to have a limited 
economy based mostly on subsistence farming and what is provided to them by their ally 
Russia.
96
 While military and economic power has been important within this conflict, the 
mobilization of freshwater resources has also been a factor.  
     The Inguri River in particular has played a critical role in the on-going conflict 
between Georgia and Abkhazia. This river serves as a rough border between the lands 
claimed and controlled by Abkhazia and Georgia proper and has since become the focus 
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of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping. Mobilization has been 
threatened should incursions be made across the river by either side. Abkhazia even 
destroyed bridges over the river for physical protection from Georgian raids conducted in 
part to rescue kidnapped Georgian officials in 1992, but that have since continued to 
occur as part of the ethnic cleansing attempts by both sides to control the region.
97
 
Additionally Abkhazia has threatened raids of Georgian establishments across the river to 
gain Georgian concessions.
98
 Mobilization of the freshwater resources of the Inguri River 
as a political and military boundary is therefore critical, both sides fighting for control of 
the river, one to mobilize the river to close the border, the other to keep it open. 
Mobilization of the river for Abkhazia equals prevention of Georgian invasion while 
Georgia needs to mobilize the river if it is to regain control of this separatist region. This 
power dialectic, the ability to mobilize the river as a boundary, is what makes the Inguri 
River the natural choice as a border for peacekeepers to maintain. Peacekeeper presence 
at the river has prevented a significant Georgian military excursion in Abkhazia since the 
1992 civil war, except during the 2008 Georgian-Russian conflict.  
     The Inguri River is more than a boundary though. Historically both sides have 
maintained joint control of the river and its resources. Joint control or joint mobilization 
means that both sides maintain the ability to partially mobilize the river and its resources, 
having physical control of some parts of the river but not all. This mobilization balance of 
power continues to have implications on the conflict and has led to greater Abkhazian 
autonomy. It has been a factor of peace, or at least stability and cooperation throughout 
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the conflict. This is particularly true for the freshwater and hydroelectric resources 
provide by the dam complex on the river.  
     The Inguri River hydropower complex provides around 5.5 billion KWH yearly, 
meeting over forty percent of Georgia’s energy needs.99 Traditionally Georgia has 
controlled the dam itself while Abkhazia has controlled the power plants, with operations 
being run by both Georgian and Abkhaz managers.
100
 (For a map of the hydroelectric 
complex please see the Appendix). This means that both sides have some ability to 
mobilize the river’s hydropower resources. Should either side reap the benefits of the 
hydropower facility, they must work with the other, helping prevent sabotage by either 
group. It is this splitting of the hydropower complex that best characterizes either side’s 
ability to mobilize the Inguri River for political gain. All in all this joint mobilization has 
historically provided a 60-40 percent split of the hydroelectricity to Georgia and 
Abkhazia respectively.
101
 With this one resource providing much of the energy utilized 
by both groups, the Inguri River is important not only for economic reasons. Its joint 
mobilization is critical for everyday life in Georgia and Abkhazia. These resources are so 
critical to both societies that during the civil war cooperation over the river continued, the 
hydroelectric complex being untouched though chaos reigned all around it.
102
 Scholars 
Paula Garb and John Whiteley say that the hydroelectric “complex is simply too vital for 
either side to lose,” and so battle plans were made to specifically leave the Inguri River 
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hydropower complex in operation.
103
 Cooperation has been cemented, the river’s joint-
mobilization now a major focus of diplomatic initiatives such as the Georgian-Abkhaz 
Coordinating Committee on Practical Issues.
104
 In 1997, for instance, the Coordinating 
Council stated that one of its focuses was the “establishment of effective cooperation” 
towards energy, the economy and the environment including the Inguri River.
105
 There 
have also been several negotiations seeking to ensure that joint mobilization of the 
hydroelectric complex continues. The United Nations and European Union have focused 
on restoration of the dam and hydroelectric plants, finding that such a project “has set a 
positive example for the donor community in terms of promoting economic development 
as a means of conflict resolution and establishing trust between two sides.”106 
Additionally workers at the hydroelectric plant point out that sharing the power complex 
has been one of the only, and also most effective, institutions starting dialogue, trust 
building, and cooperation between the two warring groups.
107
 Garb and Whiteley even 
recall a story where an Abkhaz veteran of the civil war, use to seeing only the worst in 
Georgians, was surprised and touched by Georgian engineers at the Inguri plant who 
expressed legitimate empathy and regret over a power-line problem that temporarily 
limited power to Abkhazian territory.
108
 Joint mobilization of this hydropower complex 
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therefore acts as a source of cooperation, peace, and goodwill in the middle of an ugly 
conflict.
109
     
     While the above influence is economic in nature, the relevant freshwater resources are 
not simply salient for their ability to fund either group. The Inguri River is being 
mobilized for political gain and cooperation, not just monetary compensation. The Inguri 
River is critical for both Georgia and Abkhazia to survive as independent entities. Garb 
and Whiteley have even said that “water in this case is a security issue, because its use in 
the production of electricity at the Inguri complex is fundamental to national survival and 
to the building of the nation-state,” in both Georgia and Abkhazia.110 This is not a rebel 
group attempting to mobilize resources for money, or a rebellion for an equal share of 
local resources. This is a separatist movement using its joint mobilization of a necessary 
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resource to win its independence through the benefits provide by both cooperation and at 
times coercion.  
     As in any conflict, cooperation is often matched with coercion. A group may, for 
instance, mobilize a river to demand concessions from another. Some would call this a 
“coerced, but effective cooperation,” both sides attempting to gain more control of the 
resources and therefore more control over the political situation.
111
 The hydroelectric 
complex on the Inguri River has been used for political coercion many times. In 1993 an 
explosion at the plant temporarily shut down power. This act was seen as retribution for 
the ousting of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia more so than part of the conflict 
between Georgia and Abkhazia, but it demonstrates the political nature of the river and 
its resources.
112
 Events directly linked to the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia 
started before Georgia was an independent state, just as the rift between Georgia and 
Abkhazia is older than the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1989 saboteurs broke into the 
hydroelectric plant and released water, preventing power production and creating a 
blackout across the Georgia Soviet Republic until Soviet authorities diverted energy from 
other sources.
113
 In 1997, Abkhazia temporarily cut Georgian power to force Georgia to 
reverse aggressive actions such as blocking Abkhazian international phone 
communications. The coercion worked and Abkhazia was able to get the Georgians to 
reverse many of their aggressive actions and to agree to a diplomatic meeting to discuss 
the stabilization of Georgian-Abkhaz relations.
114
 Instead of turning to violence, 
Abkhazia was able to mobilize a freshwater resource to meet political goals, such as the 
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restoration of communication to the outside world, the joint mobilization of the Inguri 
River in the conflict creating unique opportunities for stability-creating coercion.  
     A jointly mobilized freshwater resource has therefore been utilized by the separatist 
movement, Abkhazia, to demand concessions from Georgia while protecting itself from 
Georgian aggression, leading to a more stable situation in the region. Because of the 
power distribution created by joint mobilization of the Inguri River, Abkhazia is able to 
have a stable freshwater and energy source through which to rebuild its material and 
economic infrastructure, while alternatively coercing and cooperating with Georgia so as 
to have less military and political inference, allowing the political infrastructure of self-
government to be created. The joint mobilization of freshwater resources forces both 
groups to open dialogue and diplomacy while allowing the stability needed for the 
Abkhazians to strengthen their republic. The Inguri River acts like a strategic tools for 
political gain. If Georgia had the ability to completely mobilize the Inguri River, 
Abkhazia would have little recourse since it would be able to threaten Georgia neither 
militarily nor through the use of the Inguri River as a political weapon. Should Abkhazia 
gain full mobilization of the river, Georgia would have to react violently to at least 
restore the current power balance since it is so dependent on the river. If it wants to 
prevent Abkhaz independence, the contextual evidence suggests Georgia will have to 
increase its position in this freshwater resource power dialectic, gaining more control of 
the Inguri River. One reason this power balance has such an effect may be because 
Georgia, as the larger user of Inguri resources, has more to lose. Abkhazia, however, is 
also greatly dependent on Inguri River resources and suffers from their interruption as 
well. Perhaps as the group seeking its independence and freedom, it is more willing to 
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accept the consequences of mobilizing the Inguri River as a political tool. Control of the 
power plants as opposed to the dam itself may additionally facilitate easier mobilization 
of the Inguri River for political gain. In any case, Abkhazia has become increasingly 
independent from Georgia, suggesting that the joint mobilization and subsequent 
cooperation and coercion is working. Stability has been found through the utilization of 
joint mobilization of a freshwater resource. 
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Resource Mobilization as Strategy and Tactics: Russian Intervention Case Study 
 
     The Georgian-Abkhazian case study therefore suggests that joint mobilization of 
freshwater resources can be used as a peaceful yet political tool. Like any factor in a 
power relationship, however, freshwater resource mobilization also has the power to 
destabilize and can even allow outside influence, acting as a weapon of intervention. 
Russian intervention into the politics of its neighbors, into the Georgian-Abkhaz and 
Ukrainian conflicts specifically, demonstrates how mobilization of freshwater resources 
may also be utilized by an outside power to intervene in the affairs of a separate entity.  
     While the previous Georgian-Abkhazian case study presented an accurate depiction of 
the situation in the region historically, this conflict continues to be dynamic, changing in 
nature. Through increasing Russian influence, the power to mobilize the Inguri River is 
shifting, altering the political reality of the situation. Russian intervention appears to be 
granting Abkhazia a greater ability to mobilize the Inguri River, weakening Georgia’s 
position. Unfortunately for Abkhazia their gains from this power shift are superficial at 
best. Russia has nearly complete control over its relationship with Abkhazia, making it 
the main power holder in the conflict today. One way that Russia has been able to make 
the conflict work towards its own, third-party interests has been through Russian 
mobilization of the Inguri River.  
     There are many reasons that Russia could be interested in gaining full mobilization of 
the Inguri River and, as a result, control over Georgia and Abkhazia. It may be attempting 
to widen its political influence over the Russian periphery including Georgia and 
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Abkhazia, a Council of Europe resolution finding Russian actions in Abkhazia to be 
“attacks on the economic and strategic infrastructure of the country which can be deemed 
to be either a direct attack on the sovereignty of Georgia…or an attempt by Russia to 
extend its influence over a "near abroad".”115 This is particularly important for Russian 
interests because it would assist in foiling Georgia’s plans to make a “Caucasus corridor” 
of gas pipelines that do not transverse Russia.
116
 Russia may, however, wish to simply 
bring peace to the region, helping the Abkhaz gain independence to quiet a turmoil ridden 
area that has significant impacts within Russia’s own slice of the Caucasus region.  
     Regardless of why, Russian “support” for Abkhazia has increased steadily, Russia 
even recognizing Abkhazia as an independent and sovereign state in 2008.
117
 Abkhazians 
are both thankful for Russian support but also weary, realizing that they are gaining 
independence from one state while losing it to another. Russia assisted the Abkhaz in 
their civil war, and again during the Georgian-Russian War of 2008. Currently Russian 
troops act as peacekeepers within the Abkhaz republic. Russia has propped up the 
Abkhazian economy and improved its infrastructure; however this has translated into 
Abkhazian economic dependence on Russia. Hundreds of thousands of Abkhazians have 
also been awarded joint citizenship in the Russian Federation.
118
 Russia has additionally 
corrupted Abkhazian politics, such as when Abkhazian President Bagapsh fell from 
Russia’s favor leading to a Russian blockade of Abkhazia until the Abkhaz agreed to a 
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new government involving more Russian-friendly politicians.
119
 Deals made between 
Georgia and Russia, especially over energy, have created fears within Abkhazia of an 
attempt to sideline them, privatizing control of Abkhaz resources including perhaps the 
Inguri River.
120
 Most recently President Putin of Russia solidified his country’s control 
over Abkhazia through the signing of a treaty in November 2014 granting the Russian 
government decision-making power and increased control over the Abkhazian military, 
its foreign policy and economy. While Georgia called this an illegal movement towards 
annexation, it suggests that the Abkhaz have become so dependent that they are unable to 
truly saying no to Russia.
121
  
     Full mobilization of the Inguri River has long been a focus of the Russians as they 
attempt to gain influence over both Abkhazia and Georgia. For instance while traveling in 
the area scholars Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell remember feeling like Russia 
controlled the Inguri River, its helicopters patrolling above while Russian FSB officers 
often stopped people in the surrounding area.
122
 This presence is part of what is officially 
a Russian peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia. The Russians claim that their troops need 
to patrol the area around the Inguri River because the “withdrawal of Russian 
peacekeepers can lead to catastrophic consequences for the civil population and 
destabilization of the situation in these regions.”123 While this may be true, it is also clear 
                                                          
119
 Ellen Barry, “Self-Ruled Region Remains Wary of Russian Backers,” The New York Times, 17 May 2009, 
A12. 
120
 Ibid.  
121
 David Herszenhorn, “Pact Tightens Russian Ties with Abkhazia,” New York Times, 24 November 2014, 
<www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/world/europe/pact_tightens_russian_ties_with_abkhazia.html?_r=0>.  
122
 Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “Abkhazia on Three Wheels,” World Policy Journal, 27:2 (2010), 
76.  
123
 “Statement of the State Duma on policy of the Russian Federation regarding Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
and Transdnistria,” 21 March 2008, Regional Conflicts in Georgia: The Collection of Political-Legal Acts, 2
nd
, 
ed. Tamaz Diasamidze and Nana Tchkoidze-Japaridze, (OSCE Mission to Georgia, Tbilisi, 2008), 592.  
45 
 
that nobody uses the Inguri River anymore without Russian military approval, drastically 
changing the previous joint mobilization of the river and the security it provided to 
Georgia and Abkhazia. One paramount Russian military installation in the area is a joint 
Abkhaz-Russian military base near the Kodori Gorge and the hydropower complex on the 
Inguri River.
124
 This base provides Russia the capability to rapidly restore order to the 
power complex, but also to ensure its influence over transmission of hydropower leading 
many to wonder if Russia truly favors joint mobilization of the Inguri River. Though the 
Russian government does not physically control any of the hydropower complex, its 
ability to militarily influence it on a whim suggests that Russia can mobilize the Inguri 
River for its own gain. 
     One thing is certain; Georgia has lost some of its power to mobilize the resources of 
the river because of Russia’s increasing influence, an important factor to consider when 
studying Georgia’s position in the conflict. Energy expert Davit Ebralidze fears that “the 
fact that the dam of the Inguri plant is on the Georgian-controlled territory and the 
remaining is in Abkhazia does not mean that both sides enjoy the same rights” since 
“[t]he unfortunate fact is that Georgia possesses no real levers” to pressure Abkhazia or 
Russia over Inguri River disputes.
125
 Now with Russia behind them and willing to 
provide them with electricity should Inguri hydroelectric production be interrupted, the 
Abkhaz have fewer potential consequences from political mobilization of the river by 
either side, and are therefore less fearful of Georgia. Forty percent of Georgian power 
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still comes from the Inguri River complex, leaving Georgia dangerously dependent.
126
 An 
emboldened Abkhazia is consequently starting to demand more control of the plant, 
former President Bagapsh saying that “The Inguri hydro-electric power plant has always 
been ours…Georgia has no rights whatsoever to it…during any kind of talks it will be us 
who will dictate the conditions.”127 Though the Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Shamba claims that there are however no plans to end joint mobilization or to prevent 
Georgians from working in the dam, it seems inevitable that in the future Abkhazia will 
gain full control of the plant, at least superficially, with Russia as a backer. Unfortunately 
for Abkhazia such a situation would actually function as a Russian full mobilization of 
the river and its resources. Davit Ebralidze claims that Russia is behind Abkhazian 
demands for more control while trying to remain diplomatically hidden itself, so that the 
West does not blame it for bullying Georgia.
128
 It is known that after the war in 2008 
Abkhazia did gain control of parts of the hydroelectric operation that had previously been 
under Georgian control, but it remains unclear how much since some of these reports 
were likely Abkhazian propaganda.
129
  
     Interestingly enough, Georgia has recently made a deal with the Russian company 
InterRAO to share control of the Inguri dam for a guarantee of forty to fifty percent of the 
hydropower outputs, the Georgian Minister of Economic Development Lasha Zhvania 
claiming that “one hundred percent of Inguri hydroelectric plant was, is, and will be the 
property of Georgia forever,” with a Georgian director leading a mixed Russian and 
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Georgian workforce in the dam. However this shows that Georgia is actually losing its 
hand to Russia, Georgian opposition leader Levan Vepkhvadze claiming that the $9 
million agreement is “a very low price for losing this vitally important object in 
Abkhazia.” Additionally this deal demonstrates that Russia, not Abkhazia, is truly 
increasing its ability to mobilize the Inguri River, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Shamba complaining in vain that any deal should have been agreed to by Abkhazia.
130
 
Additionally Georgia has passed a law reconfirming its ability to control the Inguri River 
Basin and to regulate resources in occupied territory like Abkhazia.
131
 How much they 
will be able to stand up to Russia to enforce this law has yet to be seen, but it is clear that 
Georgia realizes it is losing its joint mobilization and therefore its previous position in the 
power balance over the Inguri River. It is now attempting to regain some of the ability to 
mobilize the river that it has lost. Russia is however slowly gaining the ability to fully 
mobilize this paramount regional resource, increasing its influence in Georgian and 
Abkhazian affairs.  
    It is unclear what the consequences of increased Russian mobilization of the Inguri 
River will be. However, it is clear that both Georgia and Abkhazia are likely to suffer as a 
result of losing their joint mobilization of the freshwater resources. The stability created 
by the joint mobilization of the river will likely be ended as Russia mobilizes the river to 
gain concessions from Georgia. The Inguri River no longer acts as a means for 
Abkhazian independence, but as a means for cementing Abkhazia’s subservience to 
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Russia. Abkhazia will therefore suffer from a lack of independence and successful 
political concessions similar to what their situation would be if Georgia had full 
mobilization of the river. Losing its joint mobilization of the river, Georgia will have to 
either militarily or diplomatically retake what it has lost, or quickly find alternate sources 
of both freshwater and electricity to avoid the possibility of  destructive mobilization of 
the Inguri River by Russia. In this way the Inguri River is a political tool for Russian 
interests, similar to Russia’s use of oil and natural gas as a political weapon, according to 
western governments and media.  
      Beyond the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the mobilization of freshwater is also 
influencing Ukrainian-Russian relations, which have recently descended into serious 
conflict. This turmoil all started with the Euromaidan protests in late 2013 which led to 
President Viktor Yanukovych fleeing the country as well as Russia annexing Crimea and 
supporting a rebellion in Eastern Ukraine that continues to this day.   
      The mobilization of freshwater had previously been one of many limiting factors 
preventing the ethnically Russian majority in Crimea from seeking independence from 
Ukraine. In the past the Ukrainian government doubted Crimea had the resolve to 
separate from the country, pointing out that “Crimea’s lack of viability as a separate state 
because of its total dependence on Ukraine for energy, water, and transportation links, as 
well as Russian wariness about annexing the peninsula, would bring Simferopol into 
line” should conflict occur.132 Crimea could never separate partially because Ukraine 
controlled all the freshwater. This demonstrates that it is not just in Central Asia that the 
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mobilization of freshwater determines who fights and who does not. However once 
Russia got involved in the separation Crimea knew that it would be able to  mobilize the 
freshwater resources it needed, ending Ukrainian control of its freshwater. On March 25
th
 
in 2014 acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov shut down electrical power to 
Crimea to remind Crimea and Russia that Ukraine controls the electricity and freshwater 
that they depend upon. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev addressed the event, 
admitting the weakness, saying that “another infrastructure problem is Crimea’s 
dependence on Ukrainian power and water supplies…this dependency periodically makes 
itself felt, including last night.” He then called for Russia to quickly work to mobilize 
new freshwater and energy sources in Crimea while providing humanitarian aid in the 
meantime.
133
 Crimean fears of being unable to survive once cut from the resources, 
including freshwater, provided by Ukraine were thus eased, part of Russia’s intervention 
and annexation being the immediate elimination of Crimean dependence on Ukrainian 
electricity and freshwater resources. Russian intervention, and its guarantee to mobilize 
alternative freshwater resources was therefore and important factor leading to the unrest 
in the region and an important step for Russia in securing its authority and control over 
Crimea.  
     Additionally freshwater is a hidden factor in the conflict raging in Eastern Ukraine. 
This rebellion has ethnic roots, but also entails economic and political self-interests. The 
fact that most of the freshwater resources needed to maintain Eastern Ukrainian industry 
are self-contained has helped fuel separatism in the region.
134
 Should these regions have 
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been more dependent on the rest of Ukraine for freshwater resources, for daily life and 
economic output, the rebels would have either needed to secure Russian freshwater 
resources like Crimea or fight for control of a larger portion of Ukraine, ensuring that the 
Ukrainian government not be able to mobilize freshwater, starving the breakaway 
republics of this critical resource.    
     The mobilization of freshwater resources has therefore been a fundamental factor in 
Russian interventions into the political affairs of its neighboring states like Georgia and 
Ukraine. While many have debated Russia’s use of oil and natural gas in an 
interventionist manner, these case studies demonstrate that the mobilization of other 
natural resources, such as freshwater, ought to also be considered. Russia certainly 
appears to understand the role of freshwater resource mobilization in these conflicts, 
requiring that scholars and policymakers from other countries account for freshwater 
mobilization as well.   
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Conclusion 
 
     The above case studies demonstrate that both identity and mobilization through 
freshwater resources are fundamental factors in conflict that need to be considered even 
in regions like the Former Soviet Union. The Central Asian case study explores how 
freshwater connects to identity to be a causation of conflict, while the Georgian-
Abkhazian and Russian intervention case studies show freshwater resources being 
mobilized to impact the strategy and tactics utilized in conflict. Freshwater resources are 
certainly not the only factor in modern conflict, but frequently they do impact when 
groups enter into conflict and how this conflict is carried out. Lack of freshwater 
resources can cause famine and consequently unrest, it can threaten group identities 
leading to violence between groups, and in the right context be mobilized as a political 
tool or weapon to solidify the political position of a group in conflict. Understanding 
freshwater resources through the lenses of identity and mobilization leads to the 
conclusion that while freshwater resources are often part of the problem they can also be 
part of the solution. If peace is to be had in several regions currently plagued by conflict, 
freshwater resources must be accounted for.  
     I have argued, by enhancing the theoretical model of Jane Dawson, that freshwater 
resources have the ability, in theory, to be a fundamental factor in conflict. The case 
studies demonstrate this logic occurring in actual situations within the Former Soviet 
Union. Any complete analysis of these conflicts therefore requires the discussion of the 
connection between both identity and mobilization with freshwater resources. Even in 
52 
 
regions like the Former Soviet Union where oil and natural gas gain most of the attention, 
other natural resources have significant influence.  
     Freshwater resources are expected to become an even greater part of conflict, not just 
in the Former Soviet Union, but around the world. This is because of climate change and 
increasing demand. Climate change, especially unabated, will drastically alter 
hydrological cycles around the planet. This will bring drought and decreasing freshwater 
supplies, even to regions that traditionally have had few fears of freshwater problems. 
Freshwater is also plagued by increasing demand because of population and economic 
growth. More people means more thirsty mouths, but also more hands to pick up arms 
should adequate freshwater not be supplied, or be perceived to be controlled by an 
opposing group. Freshwater resources are also critical for industry. Any government that 
hopes to keep power through the provision of economic growth will quickly find that an 
ample freshwater supply is necessary for progress and that freshwater is a matter of 
national interest and even security.  
     Critics may find freshwater resources to be of limited influence in modern conflict, 
despite the evidence against such a claim. However, just as oil was once a trifling matter 
that suddenly became a major factor in wars and conflict, freshwater will increasingly 
become a part of conflict the world over. Freshwater can therefore no longer be ignored 
by scholars and policymakers. As is beautifully stated by Brahma Chellaney: 
     Given that academics have debated endlessly the nature and causes of 
war without being able to reach agreement even on what actions amount to 
waging a war, the debate on water wars is likely to be similarly never 
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ending. But understanding the connections between water scarcity and 
…conflict is essential if the international community is to avert water wars 
by reining in the rasping hydroconflicts.
135
 
Stephen McCaffrey agrees saying: 
Indeed, in view of the growing scarcity of fresh water per capita, as well 
as the expanding threats to water quality and the integrity of freshwater 
ecosystems, it is not unlikely that disputes over shared freshwater 
resources will actually increase in the future, as we have seen. This 
ominous prospect calls for the development of new approaches – legal, 
institutional and conceptual- to these problems.
136
            
The world has never faced freshwater issues like those of modern times. Not only will 
freshwater-caused conflict increase, but freshwater as a mobilized political tool is also on 
the rise. Freshwater resources are therefore a fundamental factor in modern conflict. It is 
time to get serious about this issue, as a means for both war and peace, instead of holding 
fast to the limitations of traditional understandings of power structures and conflict. 
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 Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 55. 
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 McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 56. 
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Appendix: Inguri River Map 
 
 
Map Showing the Inguri River Hydropower Complex.
137
 
  
                                                          
137 Garb and Whiteley, “A Hydropower Complex on Both Sides of a War,” 222.  
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